In the last decade, members of the computational lingt, istics community have adopted a perspective on discourse based primarily on either Rhetorical Structure Theory or Grosz and Sidner's Theory. However, only recently, re.+ searchers have started to investigate the relationship between the two perspectives. In this paper, we use Moscr and Moore's (1996) work as a departure point for extending Marcu's formalization of RST (1996). The result is a tirst-order axiomatization of the mathematical prol+er-ties o1' text structures and of the rehttionship between the strttcture of text and intentions. The axiomatization enables one lo use intentions for reducing the ambiguity o1' discourse and the structure of discourse for deriving intentional inferences.
Abstract
In the last decade, members of the computational lingt, istics community have adopted a perspective on discourse based primarily on either Rhetorical Structure Theory or Grosz and Sidner's Theory. However, only recently, re.+ searchers have started to investigate the relationship between the two perspectives. In this paper, we use Moscr and Moore's (1996) work as a departure point for extending Marcu's formalization of RST (1996) . The result is a tirst-order axiomatization of the mathematical prol+er-ties o1' text structures and of the rehttionship between the strttcture of text and intentions. The axiomatization enables one lo use intentions for reducing the ambiguity o1' discourse and the structure of discourse for deriving intentional inferences.
I Motivation
I n the last decade, members of the computational l inguislies cotnnmnity have adopted a perspective on discourse based prinlarily on either l{hetorical Structure Theory (P, ST) (Matin and Thompson, 1988) or Grosz and Sid her's Theory (GST) (Grosz and Sidnet. 1986 ).
In GSq, the linguistic constituents are called discom'xe segments (DS) and the lingt, istic discourse slructure is explicitly stipulated to be a tree o1' recursively embedded discourse segments. Each discourse segment is charactel+ized by a prinmry intention, which is called discomwe segment lmrpose (DSP) . GST identilies only two kinds o1' intention-based relations that hold between the DSPs of two discourse segments: domittance and sati.@tction precedence. When a discourse segment purpose DSPI that characterizes discourse segment DS1 provides part of the satisfaction of a discourse segment purpose DSP., that characterizes discourse segment DS..,, with DS1 being embedded in DS2, it is said that there exists a dominance relation between DSP~ and DSlq, i.e., DSP.e dominates DSpI. 1t' the salislhction of DSP, is a condition of the satisfaction oI'DSP2, it is said that DSP1 sati,@tction-precedes DSP.,.
RST has a richer ontology of relations than GST: intentional and semantic rhetorical relations are considered to hold between non-overlaplfing textual spans. Most of these relations are asymmetric, i.e., they distinguish between their associated nuclei, which express what is most essential to the writer's purpose, and their satellites, which support tile nuclei. In RS'I, the linguisticdiscourse structure is modeled recursively as a tree of related segments. Hence, unlike GSq, where relations are considered to hold between the DSPs associated with embedded segments, relations in RST hold between adjacent, non-overlapping segments.
Because RST has traditionally been applied to build discourse trees of liner granularity than GST, we will use it here as the starting point of our discussion. Assume, for example, that we are given tim following text (in which the elementary textual units arc labelled lbr reference).
(I) INo matlcr how much one wants to stay a non-smoker, ^~ ]
[the truth is that the pressure to smoke in junior high is greater than it will be any other time of one's life) q ] IWe know tim[ 3,000 teens start smoking each day, q ] lalthough it is a fact that 90% of them once thoughl thai smoking was something that Ihey'd never do. D~ I
Assume for the moment that we do not analyze this text as a whole, but rather, we dctcrlnine what rhetorical relations could hold between every pair of elementary units. When we apply, for example, the definitions proposed by Mann and Thompson (1988) , we obtain the set given below, l
These relations hold because the tmdcrstanding of both A1 (teens want to stay non-smokers) and I:h (90% o1' the teens think that smoking is something that they wotdd never do) will increase the reader's readiness to accept the writer's right to present Ih (the pressure on teens to start smoking is greater than it will be any other time of their lives); the understanding of c1 (3000 teens start smoking each day) will increase the reader's belief of 1~1; the recognition of Ih as something compatible with
IThroughoul this paper, we use the convention lhat rhelorical relations are represented as stated, lirst-order predicales having lhe fornl rhct_rel (,act.me, mLzellite, ?~mlcus) .
Mullint|-clear relalions are represented as predicales having Ihe ['orlll rhct_rcl( ~m',~c, n~tcle'usl , ~uclcus~ Consider also a slightly difl'erent problem: assume that besides rhetorical judgments, such as those shown in (2), one can also make intentional judgments. For example, assume that one is interested in an interpretation in which one knows that the DSP of seg,nent [&, D1] , which contains all units from A1 tO 1)1, dominates the DSP of seg-
Then what is the primary intention of the text in that case'? And how many discourse trees are both valid and consistent with that intentional judgment? Neither RST nor GST can answer these questions on their own. However, a unified theory can. Ill this paper, we provide such a theory.
The limits of Moser and Moore's approach
In a recent proposal, Moser and Moore (1996) argued that the primary intentions in a GST representation can be derived fi'om the nuclei ot'the corresponding RST representation. Although their proposal is consistent with the cases in which each textual span is characterized by an explicit nucleus that encodes the primary intention of that span (as in the case of text (I)), it seems that an adequate account of the correspondence between GST and RST is somewhat more complicated. For example, in tile case of text (3) below, whose RST analysis is shown in ligure 2, we cannot apply Moser and Moore's approach because we can associate tile primary intention of discourse segment [a2, B2] neither to trait A2 nor to trait B2. In Grosz and Sidner's terms, we can say that the primary intention ot' segment [A2, B~] is (Intend writer (Believe reader "John wanted to do two things that were incompatible")). But in order to recognize this relation, we need to recognize that the two desires given in units A~ and B2 are incompatible, which is captured by the CON-TRAST relation that holds between the two units. In other words, the intention associated with segment [A2, B2] is a function both el' its nuclei, A 2 and B2, and of the rhetorical relation of CONTRAST that holds between them. In this paper, we generalize this obserwttion by making use o1" the compositionality criterion proposed in (Marcu, 1996) , which stipulates that it'a rhetorical relation holds between two textual spans, a si,nilar relation also holds between two salient constructs of those spans. 2 Similarly, we will assume that the primary intention of a discourse segment is not given by the nucleus of the corresponding relation but rather that it depends on the corresponding relation and the salient constructs associated with that segment.
Melding text structures and intentions

Formulation of the problem
Formally, the problem that we want to solve is the following. Given a sequence of textual units U = tq, u2,..., UN, a set 1U~ of rhetorical relations that hold among these units, and a set o1' intentional judgments IH that pertain to the same units, find all legal discourse structures (trees) of U, and determine the dominance, satisl'action-precedence relations, and primary intentions of each span of these trees.
Following (Marcu, 1996) , we use tile predicates posiHo,z (ui, j) and vl, eId'd(,za,,,e, s, ,z) with the fol2Seclion 3 discusses in detail how the salient construcls are delermined.
lowing semantics: tim predicate posilion(ui, j) is tree for a textual unit ul in sequence U if and only if ul is the j-th element in the sequence; the predicate rhei_vel (namc, ui, uj) is true for textual units ul and uj witb respect to rhetorical relation name, if and only it' the detinition provided by RST for rhetorical relation name applies to textual units ui, in most cases a satellite, and uj, a nucleus. In order to enable discourse problems to be characterized by rhetorical judgments that hold between large textual spans as well, we use predicate rh.cl_rel_ext(namc, s~, s~, *~, n~). This predicate is trl, e for textual spans [ss, .%] and [,,.,, n0 ] with respect to rhetorical relation name if and only if the detinition of rhetorical relation name applies for tim textual span that ranges over units ss--se, ill most cases a satellite, alld textual spans that ranges over units n.~-nc, a nucleus. 3
From a rhetorical perspective, text (I) is described at the minimal unit level by the relations given in (2) and (4) below.
The intentional judgments 1~1 are given by the following functions and predicates:
• The predicate dom (l~, lq, 1~, h-,) i.e., l, </~ < h., < h, A (h ¢ z~ v h~ # h~).
• The predicate salpvec (ll, Ih, lu, h • Tile oracle function .fl (r, aq,..., ;%) takes as at:
guments a rhetorical relation r and a set of texttufl units, and returns tbe primary intention that pertains to that relation and those units. For example, in the case of segment [A2, Be] in text (3), the oracle function .l) (CONTRAST, A2, B2) is assullted to returu a Iirst-order object wltose meaning can be glossed as "inform the reader that John wanted to do two things that were incompatible". And the oracle function .1) (EWDI ~;NcE, B1) associated with segntent [A1,1)~] in text (1) is assuntcd to return a [irst-oMer object whose nteaning can be glossed as "increase the reader's belief that the pressure to smoke in junior high is greater than it will be any other time of one's life".
Without restricting the generality of the problem, discourse structures are assented to be binary trees. In our formalization, each node era discourse structure is characlerized by l()tu" features: the status (nucleus or satellite), tim O'lJe (the rhetorical relations tlmt hold between 3'Fhe s ~llld e subscripls COlTCgpond Io .~tm'ling ~.lll(I ending posilions. the text spans that that node spans over), the l)romotion set (the set of units that constitute the most "salient" (irapertain) part of the text that is spanned by that node), and tile i)rima O, intelltion. By convention, for each leaf node, the type is LEAF, the promotion set is tile textual unit to which it corresponds, and tbe primary intention is that of inJbmting the content of that unit. For exampie, a representation of the tree in ligure 1.a that makes explicit the features el' all spans that play an active role in the final representation is given in [igure 3. In general, the salient units are computed using the comlmsitionality criterion proposed in (Marcu, 1996) , i.e, they are given by the union of the salient units of the immediate subordinated nuclei. Similarly, the primary intentions are a function of tbe rhetorical relation (type) and salient units of each span.
The status, type, promotion set, and primary intention that are associated with each node in a discourse trec provide suflieient information for a full description of an instance of a tree structure. Given the linear nature of text and the fact that we cannot predict in advance where the boundaries between various segments will be d,'awn, we should provide a lnethodology that permits one to enumerate all possible ways in which a tree could bc built on the lop of a linear sequence of elementary discourse units. The solution we use relies on tile same intuition that constitutes tile foundation of chart parsing: just as a chart parser is capable of consklering all possible ways in which different words in a sentence could be chlstered into higher-order grammatical units, so our formalization is capable of considering all the possible ways in which different segments coukl be joined into discourse trees. way in which a span of length n coukl be built, spa771,n.
Since it is impossible to determine a priori the sl)ans that will be used to make up a discourse tree, we will associate with each span that could possibly become part of a tree a status, a type, promotion, and primary intention relation and let discourse and intentional constraints determine the valid discourse trees. In other words, we want to ¢tetermine from the set of ha-(,,.-1)-t-(n-2) +...+ 1 = n(n4-1)/2 potentM spans that pertain to a sequence of n discourse units, the subset that adheres to some constraints of rhetorical and intentional well-formedness. • T (1, h, relation_ua.rn.e) provides the name of the rhetorical relation that holds between the text spans that are immediate subordinates o1' span El, h] in the discourse tree. If the text span is not used in the construction of the final tree, the type assigned is NONE. For example, for the tree in ligure 3, some o1' the relations that hold are: T(I, J, LEAF), 5/'(1,2, JUSTW~CATION), T(3, 4, CONC~SSrON), T(1, 3, NONE).
• P (I, h.,unit_name) is not used in the tilml tree, by convention, the set of salient units is NONE. For example, for the tree in figure 3 , some of the relations that hold are: P(1, 1., &), P(1, 2, lh), P(1,3, NONE),
1'(3, 4, D,).
• Ill, h, intention) provides the primary intention of discourse span El, h]. The term iulenlion is represented using the oracle ftmction J). For example, for the tree in figure 3 , some of the relations that tloi(t arc: I(3, 4, f/(CONCESSION, Cj )), l(J,/1, .fI(P:VIDENCI~:, B])), l(J, 3, NONE).
An integrated formalization of RST and GST
Using the ideas that we have discussed ill the previous section, we present now a first-order formalization of discourse structures that makes use both of RST-and GSTlike constraints. In this lbrmalization, wc assume a universe that consists of the set of natural numbers fi'om J tO N, where N represents the number of textual units in the text that is considered; the set of names thai were defined by Mann and Thompson for each rhetorical relation; the set of unit names that are associated with each textual unit; and four exlra constants: NUCLEUS, SATEL-LITE, NONE, and LI~2AF. The formalization is assumed lo provide unique name axioms for all these constants. The only funclion symbols that operate eve," the assumed domain are the mlditional + and -functions that are associated with the set of natural numbers and the oracle function J). The formalization uses the traditional predicate symbols that pertain to the set of natural numbers (<, <, >, >, =, ¢) and eight other predicate symbols: ,5', T, P and I to account for the status, type, salienl units, and primary intention that are associated with every text span; vhel_vel to account for the rhetorical relalions that hold between different textual units; position to account for the index of the textual units in lhe text dmt one considers; dora to account for dominance relations; and satprec to account for satisfaction-precedence relations.
Throughout the paper, we apply the convention that all unbound variables are universally quantified and that variables are represented in lower-case italics" and constants in SMALL CAPITALS. We also make use of the two extra relations, vclevaul_uni~ and relevant_tel.
For every text span span [/, hi, relevant_unit (l, h, u) describes the set ot' textual units that are relevant for that text span, i.e., the units whose positions in the initial sequence are numbers in the interval [l, hi. It is only these units that can be used to label the pro-motion set associated with a tree that subsumes all units in the interval [l, hi. For every text span [1, h.], vclevcm.Z_vcl (l, h, name) describes the set of rhetorical relations that are relevant to that text span, i.e., the set of rhetorical relations that span over text units in the interval [1, h] and the set of extended rhetorical relations that span over text spans that cover the whole interval [/, h] (see (Marcu, 1996) for the formal delinitions of these rehttions.) For example, fin" text (1), which is descrihed formally in (2) and (4), the following is the set of all rclc'~a~zl_rel and vclevctn~_unil, relations that hold with respect to text segment [l,3]: {vclcvanLvcl (l, 3, JUSTWlCaTtON) , 'rclcvanl_vcl(l, 3, EVII)ENCl0, relevcr, t_m~it(I, 3, &),  ,.~z~v.,,t_~,,nit(l, a, B~), ,.d~,:.,,z_,,,,it(l, :~, q)}.
The constraints that pertain to the discourse trees that we formalize can be partitioned into constraints related to the domain of objects over which each predicate ranges, constraints related to the structure of the tree, and constraints that relate the slrucltlral COlnponenl with the intentional component. The axioms that pertain to the domains over which predicates ,5, P, and 7' range and the constraints related to the structure of the live are the same as those given by Marcu (1996) . For lhe sake of completeness, in this paper we only enumerate then] informally. In contrast, the axioms that pertain to intentions and the relation between structure and intentions are discussed in detail.
Constraints that concern the objects over which the predicates that describe every segment [1, hi of a text structure range (Mareu, 1996 (Mareu, , pp. 1072 (Mareu, -1073 .
,, For every siren [/, h], the set or objects over which predicate ,5' ranges is the set {NUC1A,~US, SNI'ELIJTI,], NONE).
• The status of any discourse segment is unique.
• For every segment [l, h] , the set of objects over which predicate 7' ranges is the set of rhetorical relations that are relevant to that span.
• At most one rhetorical rdation can connect two adjacent discourse spans
• The primary intention of a discourse segment is either NONE or is a function of the salient units that pertain to that segment and of the rhetorical relation that holds between the immediate subordinated segments. Since we want to stay within the boundaries of Iirst-order logic, we express this (see formula (5) below) by means of a disjunction of at most N sulfformulas, which correspond to the cases in which the span has I, 2 .... , or N salient traits. 4 4Formula (5) reflects no preference concerning lhe order in which rhetorical relalions and intentions should be computed (Asher and Lascarides, 1998) . It only asserts a consh'ailll on the two. inl. c,,.lio,tu, ---fz(r, :c,, a;u,. •. , ,;,)]}
• The primary intention of any discourse segment is unique. [l, hi, the set of objects over which predicate P ranges is the set of units that make up that segment Constraints that concern /lie strnctmm of the discourse trees
• The status, type, and promotion set that are associated with a discourse segment reflect the COmlmsitionality criterion. That is, whenever a rhetorical relation holds between two spans, either a simihu" relation holds between Ihe mosl salicnl units of those spans or an extended rhetorical relation holds between those spans.
• Discourse segments do not overlap.
• A discourse segment with status NONE does not participate in the tree at all.
• There exists a discourse segment, the root, that sirens over the entire text. (1 ~ 1.9 .~ 11.2) A do?l+ (l,, lt, l, [12, h2] . Hence, axiom (8) explicates the relationship between the structure of discourse and intentional dominance. In contrast, axiom (9) explicates the relationship between intentional dominance and discourse structure. That is, if we know that the intention associated with span [lj, 1,1] dominates the intention associated with span [12, h,2], then both those spans play an active role in the representation and, moreover, the segment [12,11,2] plays a SATELLITE role.
• The satisfaction-precedence rdations described by Grosz and Sidner are parataetie relations that hold between arlfitrarily large textual spans. Nevertheless, as we have seen in the examples discussed in this paper, the fact that a paratactic relation holds between spans does not imply that there exists a satisfactionprecedence relation at the intentional level between those spans. Therefore, for satisfaction-precedence relations, we will have only OnE axiom, that shown in (I0), below. 
A computational view of the axiomatization
Given the formulation discussed abovE, tinding the discourse trees and the primary intentions lkw a text such as that given in (1) amounts to finding a model for a firstorder theory that consists of formulas (2), (4), and the axioms enumerated in section 3.
There are a number of ways in which one can proceed with an implementation: for cxalnple, a smtightforward choice is one that applies constraint-satisl'action techniques, an approach that extends that discussed in (Marcu, 1996) . Given a sequence U of N textual units, one can take advantage of the structure of the domain and associate with each of the N(N-F 1)/2 possible text spans a status and a type variable whose domains consist in the set of objects over which the corresponding predicates ,5 + and T, range. For each of the N(N + 1)/2 possible text spans [l, h.] , one can also associate h, -l + ] promolion variables. These are boolean variables that specify whether units l, (
The constl+aints associated with these wtriables arc a oneto-onE mapping o1' the axioms in section 3. Finding the set of RS-trees and the intentions that are associated with a given discourse reduces then to/inding all the solutions for a traditional constraint-satisfaction problem.
Applications
Reasoning from text structures to intentions. Consider again the example text (1), which was usEd throughout this paper. As we discussed in section 1, il' we assume that an analyst (or a program) determines that the rhetorical relations given in (2) hold between the elementary units of the text, there arc live valid trees that correspond to text (1) (see figure 1) . If we consider now the axioms that dEscribE the relationship bEtwEen text structures and intentions, we can infer, for example, thai, for the tree I.a, the DSP of span [A1,131] dominates the DSP of span [cj, l)j] and that the primary intention of the whole text depends on unit B1 and on the rhetorical relation of EVID]]NCF,. Ill such a casE, the axiomatization provides the means for drawing intentional inferences on the basis of the discourse structure. Also, although there are live discourse structures that are consistent with the rhetorical judgments in (I), they yield only three intentional interpretations, i.e., there arc only three primary intentions that one can associate to the whole text. One intention is that discussed above, which is associated with analysis I.a. Another intention depends on unit Bz and the JUSTIFICATION relation that holds between units A1 and lh; this intention is associated with the analyses shown in ligure 1.c and l.e. And another intention depends on trait Bj and the JUSTIFICATION relation that holds between units l)j and Bj ; this intention is associated with the analyses shown in figure 1.b and 1.d.
Reasoning fronl text structures to intentions can be also beneficial hi a context such as that described by Lochbaum (1998) because the rhetorical constraints can help prune the space of shared phms that woukl characterize an intEn tional interpretati o n of a d iscou rse.
Using intentions lbr nmnaging rhetorical amlfiguities. Assume now that besides providing.ivdgments concerning the rhetorical rehttions that hold between various units, an analyst (ot" a progran0 provides judglnents of intentions as well. If, lk+t" cxaml+le, besides the relations given in (2) a program determines that the DSP of span tAt, 1)1] dominates 111o DSP of unit I/i, the theory that corresponds to these judgments and 111e axioms given in section 3 yields only two wdid text structures, those presented in [igure l.b and I.d. In this ease, the axiomatization provides the means of using intentional judgments for reducing the ambiguity that characterizes the discourse parsing process.
hwestigating the relationship between semantic and intentional relations. In their seminal paper, Moore and Polhtck (1992) showed lhat a text may be characterized by intentional and rhetorical analyses that are not isomorphic. For example, for the text shown in (1 I) below, which is taken from (Moore and Pollack, 1992), one may argue from an informational perspective that A3 is a CONI)ITION ['or B3. However, l}'otll an intentional perspective, one may argue thai 1',3 can be used to MOTI-VATI'; A3. Similal + judgments can be made with respect to units 1{3 and c3. Hence, lhe set of relations that COlnpletely characterizes text (11) is thal shown in (12) When given this discourse problenl, our implementation produces the four discourse trees shown iu figure 4, each el + them having a different primary intention (./"/(CONI)ITION, C3), f!(MOTIVATION, a3), .ft (MOTWATION, B3) , and ./) (CONl)rrtoN, I+:~)).
Hence, our approach enables one to derive automatically and enumerate all possible rhetorical interpretations of a text and to study the rehttionshil~ between structure and intentions. Our approach does not provide yet the mechanisms for choosing between different interpretations, but it provides the foundations for such a study. In contrast, Moore and Pollaek's informal approach could neither derive nor enumerate all possible interpretations: in fact, their discttssion refers only to the two trees shown in ligure 4.a and .b. Unlike Moore and Polhtck's approach, where it is suggested that a discourse representation should reflect simultaneously both its informational and intentional interpretations, the approach presented here is capable of only enumerating these interpretations. The formal model we proposed is not rich enough to accotlllllodate conctlrretH, non-isomorphic interpretations. 
Conclusion
Crucial to tile develolmlent of syntactic theories was the ability to provide mechanisms capable of deriving all valid syntactic interpretations of a given sentence. Semantic or corpus-specific information was then used to manage the usually large number of interpretations. The work described in this paper sets theoretical foundations that enable a similar approach to the study of discourse. The way a syntactic theory enables all wtlid syntactic trees of a sentence be derived, the same way the axiomatization presented here enables all valid discourse trees of a text be derived. But the same way a sylltactic theory may produce trues that arc incorrect ftonl a semantic perspective for example, the same way the axiomalization described here may produce trees that are incorrect when, for example, focus and cohesion are factored in.
A ntmlber o1' researchers have ah'eady shown how individual rhetorical and intentional judgments can be derived automatically l'mm linguistic constructs such as tense and aspect, certain patterns of pronominalization and anaphoric usages, it-clefts, and discourse markers or cue phrases. But once lhese.iudgmcnts arc made, we still need to determine all discourse interpretations that are not only consistent with these judgments but also wtlid. This paper provides mechanisms for deriving and enumerating all valid structure of a discourse and enables a quantitative study el' the relation between text structures atld intentions.
